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Abstract 
We develop a model where heterogeneous agents maximize their individual utility based on (after tax) income 
and on the level of public expenditure (as in Cowell, Gordon, 1988). Agents are different in risk aversion and in 
the relative preference for public expenditure with respect to personal income. In each period, an agent can 
optimally conceal some income based on conjectures on the perceived probability of being subject to audits, the 
perceived level of public expenditure and the perceived amount of tax paid by other individuals. 
As far as the agent-based model is concerned, we assume that the Government sets the tax rate and the penalties, 
uses all the revenue to finance public expenditure (with no inefficiency) and fights evasion by controlling a 
(random) fraction of agents. 
We show that, through computational experiments based on micro-simulations, stable configurations of tax rates 
and public expenditure endogenously form in this case as well. In such equilibrium-like situations we find: 
 a positive relationship between the tax rate and evasion still arises. 
 tax compliance mainly depends on the distribution of personal features like risk-aversion and the degree 
of preference for public expenditure.  
 an endogenous level of tax evasion that is almost not affected by reasonable rates of control. A proper 
choice of the tax rate results instead in voluntary partial compliance. 
 the enforcement of higher compliance rates requires unrealistic and costly large-scale audits. 
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1. Introduction1 
The problem of tax evasion has been always central in the theory of public finance, but its 
theoretical relevance increased over time. The seminal articles of Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) were followed by many contributions which extended and 
enriched the original model in several ways. Review articles appear periodically to examine 
the literature and describe a buoyant variety of research lines2. 
A particularly important issue is the excessive tax compliance observed in the real world with 
respect to the level that the standard model of tax evasion would predict3. Another particularly 
relevant issue is the impact of the level of tax rates on compliance, that in Allingham, Sandmo 
and Yitzhaki’s works is ambiguous or opposite to what is currently supported by common 
sense or experimental findings4. 
Following Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2008), other important issues that have been analysed 
are the impact of audit probabilities, fines, subjective tax knowledge and participation, 
attitudes toward taxes, personal and social norms, perceived fairness. 
Interesting extensions to the standard model are the explicit consideration of labour supply 
(Cowell, 1985) and of public goods (Cowell and Gordon, 1985). 
In many cases, the predictions of the theoretical literature about tax compliance are open to 
debate as they depends heavily on individual taxpayers’ characteristics, on the institutional 
framework and on the structure of the social relations. 
The necessity to investigate the impact on tax compliance of individual characteristics and 
interaction in a dynamic framework led to an increasing use of agent-based models that can 
offer some useful insights through numerical simulations of complex behaviour of 
heterogeneous agents. The seminal contribution in this field can be traced back to Mittone and 
Patelli (2000). Using an epidemic-related metaphor, the authors simulate the behaviour of 
agents whose type is honest, imitative and free rider. The taxpayers derive some utility from 
the public good and can switch to other types based on a myopic estimate of the their utility. 
The main result of the paper is that the lack (or insufficient level) of audits induce the spread 
                                                 
 
1 Paper presented at the conference SHADOW 2011, The Shadow Economy, Tax Evasion and Money 
Laundering, Muenster, 28-30/7/2011. 
 
2 See for instance Pyle (1991), Andreoni, Erard, Feinstein (1998), Slemrod, Yitzhaki (2002), Sandmo (2005), 
Cowell (2003)) 
3 See Bernasconi (1998), and the literature on tax morale. 
4 See Bernasconi, Zanardi, (2003). 
 3
of free riders at the expense of honest and fully compliant taxpayers. Many papers have since 
then adopted approaches where a set of types, endowed with different features, utilities and 
cognitive/technical abilities, is exogenously assumed to exists. Davis et al. (2003), for 
example, supports an analytical model with simulations with honest, susceptible and evader 
taxpayers and find some hysteresis in the reaction to changes in the enforcement system: a 
compliant population may shift to a state of massive evasion in the presence of too few audits 
but, in order to reverse the situation, control probabilities must be increased to levels that are 
higher than the ones that would have kept reasonable compliance in the first place.  
Agent based models have the capability to explore several issues that are difficult to deal with 
in analytical models. Repeated interaction among heterogeneous agents or between the fiscal 
administration and the taxpayers can be typically addressed by such tools, as well as 
geographical spillovers and “contagion” effects. The model presented in Korobow et al. 
(2007) is a recent work where agents are networked in localized structures and are aware of 
the actions of their neighbours. This social trait of tax evasion may indeed proves itself useful 
to explain diversity in tax compliance in different regions or environments and reflect the 
impact of peer-pressure and conformity. Korobow and co-authors find that substantial sharing 
of payoff information and tax practices can lead to less compliant behaviour. While it is not 
entirely surprising that one bad apple spoils the whole basket, the result also points out that 
low “impressionability” of taxpayers may support relative high compliance even with modest 
auditing levels. The previous result holds when agent ignore the (additional) profit from 
evasion or information diffusion on tax-related payoffs and misconducts is scarce. 
The flexibility of the agent-based methodology can, despite the risk of increasing the number 
of parameters, allow for great sophistication in the depiction of many realistic features of 
taxpayers and of the data available to the fiscal authority. Bloomquist (2006) is a good 
introduction to the field and describes the Tax Compliance Simulator where audit efficacy 
and celerity, together with a host of other parameters can be changed to test the overall 
compliance and the success of specific auditing schemes, with regard to both direct and 
indirect effects (due to additional revenues from fines and increased compliance of other 
“forewarned” taxpayers, respectively). Bloomquist (2011) builds on some of the previous 
ideas to present a situated agent-based model with 85000 agents that are calibrated using 
realistic anonymized public data from the US Internal Revenue Service. 
Hokamp and Pickhardt (2010) presents a model with four behaviourally different types, 
including rational utility maximizers, as in the work of Allingham and Sandmo, and noisy 
taxpayers who introduce random errors in their reported income. There are also ethical agents 
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(known as “honest” in other works) and imitators. The latter are located on a ring and report a 
fraction of the income equal to the average fractions declared by their contiguous neighbours. 
Such a simplified form of relationship allows for massive interaction and large agents’ 
number that appears recently in the econophysics literature, such as Zakaln et al. (2009) to 
pick a representative case. This paper contains a model with 1.000.000 agents on a grid, 
taking inspiration from the Ising model of ferromagnetism. Taxpayers have “spins” and can 
be fully compliant (+1) or non-compliant (-1), depending on the state of neighbours and 
(possibly) on some external force (say, mass media or other biases). As it is typical of similar 
models, there is a critical “temperature”, that is the degree of social influence, of the system 
that can trigger phase changes. In spite of some difficulties in the economic interpretation and 
some questionable assumptions, the model shows that occasional bursts in the evasion rate are 
possible even under a harsh enforcement system, provided decisions are influenced by the 
social temperature. See Epstein (2002) for a model of similar acute episodes in a different 
social context.  
In the present paper we develop a model where heterogeneous agents maximize their 
individual utility based on (after tax) income and on the level of public expenditure. Our 
agent-based model features utility maximizing heterogeneous taxpayers. The utility is a 
function of after-tax income, that depends on the reported income, and on the conjectured 
level of per capita public expenditure. Agents have different risk-aversion coefficients, 
distinct relative preference for public expenditure and varying trust in the likelihood that 
others will pay the due amounts. Hence, their final decision rests on micro-founded rational 
behaviour, personal characteristics and subjective judgements. The enforcement system is 
based on random auditing and agents exchange information on paid taxes and income levels 
by randomly meeting other taxpayers. While the two previous components are modelled in a 
very simple way, we focus on the relevance of the preference for public expenditure to 
provide different scenarios and equilibrium solutions where the effective tax revenue is 
exactly what agents conjecture and there is neither under- nor over-provision of public 
expenditure. 
Agents are heterogeneous in risk aversion and in the relative preference for public expenditure 
with respect to personal income. In each period, an individual can optimally conceal some 
income based on conjectures on the perceived probability of being subject to audits, the 
perceived level of public expenditure and the perceived amount of tax paid by other 
individuals. 
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We study the optimal behaviour of a single agent, investigate the symmetric Nash equilibrium 
that arises in a population of homogeneous agents and, finally, perform random simulations to 
describe a plausible equilibrium in a heterogeneous multi-agents framework. 
When analyzing the optimal behaviour of an isolated agent we find that an increase in the tax 
rate induces more compliance only for low income taxpayers, that is the classic negative 
relationship between tax rate and tax evasion. On the contrary, high income agents increase 
their evasion together with the tax rate (for reasonable levels of the tax rate). 
A Nash equilibrium in a population of homogeneous agents can be found for any exogenously 
given tax rate. We find that, depending on the under(over)-provision of public expenditure, 
two kinds of equilibria are possible. The first one is characterized by low tax rates, under-
provision and full compliance, whereas the second one has higher tax rates, over-provision 
and (partial) tax evasion. 
As far as the agent-based model is concerned, we assume that the Government sets the tax 
rate and the penalties, uses all the revenue to finance public expenditure (with no inefficiency) 
and fights evasion by controlling a (random) fraction of agents. 
We show, trough computational experiments based on micro-simulations, that stable 
configurations of tax rates and public expenditure endogenously form in this case as well. In 
such equilibrium-like situations we find: 
o A positive relationship between the tax rate and evasion still arises. 
o Tax compliance mainly depends on the distribution of personal features like risk-
aversion and the degree of preference for public expenditure.  
o There is an endogenous level of tax evasion that is almost not affected by reasonable 
rates of control. A proper choice of the tax rate results instead in voluntary partial 
compliance. 
o The enforcement of higher compliance rates requires unrealistic and costly large-scale 
audits. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model of utility maximization used 
by the agents. Broadly speaking, the setup is similar to Cowell and Gordon (1988) because 
public expenditure is considered. Moreover, this section has an extensive sensitivity analysis 
to study the optimizing agents’ behaviour for different values of relevant parameters. In the 
third Section, we define and describe the Nash equilibrium arising in a population of 
homogeneous agents. Finally, the last section attempts to generalize the previous results when 
heterogeneous agents are considered and interact in a multi-agents computational model. 
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2. The Agent behavior 
We consider two types of agents, namely individuals and the Government. Individuals 
maximize their utility under a fixed monetary income. The utility function depends on the 
after tax income and on the perceived level of public expenditure. Agents choose the fraction 
of the income to declare in order to pay income tax. Hence, they have the option to 
underreport their income to illegally reduce their tax burden. 
The Government decides the income tax rate, collects all tax payments and uses all the 
revenues to provide public expenditure. Therefore, the Government budget is always in 
balance. Possible inefficiencies in the provision of public goods are not considered. 
Government can also contrast tax evasion by controlling a proportion of individuals and by 
applying a fine on evaded taxes. 
Individual agents 
Agents face the standard problem of deciding how much of their income to declare for 
income taxation. Each individual i=1, …, N has a cardinal utility function 
[1]  iiii aGyUU ,,  
where yi is the  net (after tax) monetary income, Gi is the perceived value of public 
expenditure and  ikii aaa ,...,1  collects individual characteristics. 
We suppose the utility function satisfies the following assumptions. 
Assumption 1: positive marginal utility of income and public expenditure: 
[2] 0

y
i
U
y
U  and 0

G
i
U
G
U  
Assumption 2: concavity of utility function: 
[3] 0

yy
i
y U
y
U
,  0

GG
i
G U
G
U  and 02  yGGGyy UUU  
Assumption 3: minimum level of utility reached when 0iy  and 0iG : 
[4] )0,0(min UU   
Assumption 4: minimum level of utility reached when 0iy  or 0iG : 
[5] minU )0,0(),0()0,( UGU yU   
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One specification that satisfies all previous assumptions is: 
[6]   ),(),(,, iiiiiii aGayaGyU   
with 0,0  yyy  , 0,0  GGG   and   ),0(),0(,0,0 iii aaaU  . In particular we assume 
that: 
[7]   ii   ii
i
i GyU




1
1
1  
where ii
i
ii yay




1
1
1),( and )1(),( iiiii GaG
  , 0i  is the relative risk aversion 
parameter and 0i  represents the relative intensity of individual preference about public 
expenditure with respect to net income. 
With this Cobb-Douglas-type utility function, concavity requires 11  i , 1)1(1  i  and 
1)1)(1( 1  i . 
As the parameters i  and i  are chosen by each individual, utility functions are different 
across individuals. 
 
Income tax and tax evasion control 
Income tax is applied, at a constant rate  , to the exogenous amount of income Ii, which is 
only known to the taxpayer. Hence, the amount of taxes paid by individual i is: 
[8] iii IdT   
where 10  id  is the share of gross income declared to Government. Each agent can pick 
his di , actually opting for full ( di  0), partial ( di  0) or no ( di 1) tax evasion. 
Given the control activity of the Government, each individual faces a probability q of being 
controlled. If an individual is audited, her tax evasion is certainly discovered and she has to 
pay a fine of  f  times the amount of evaded tax: 
[9] iii IdfF )1(   
In the simulations of the model that will be presented in Section 3, individuals do not know 
exactly the probability of control q, but estimate their own subjective ip . 
If the taxpayer is not controlled, his net income is  
[10] )1()( iiiii dITIdW   
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If the taxpayer is audited, his net income is: 
[11] iiiiiii IdfIFTIdZ  )1()1()(   
Each individual knows that in aggregate the Government budget constraint holds, therefore 
the value of public expenditures is equal to total tax revenue: 
[12] 
i
ii IdG   
Public expenditure can be decomposed in two parts: the part paid by individual i and the part 
paid by all others, so that: 
[13] G  diIi  dkIk
k1,k i
N  
We define the per capita public expenditure financed by all other individuals as: 
[14] ˜ gi  1N 1 dkIkk1
k i
N  
Substituting into [16]: 
[15] G  diIi  (N 1) ˜ gi  
When choosing the percentage of income to declare, each taxpayer has to estimate the 
reaction of other individuals.. This expectation is modelled as a weighted average between the 
agent’s conjecture about other people’s average tax payment, iT
~ , and the observed level of 
per capita public expenditure in the previous period 1g . Agent i’s expectation about other 
people’s average contribution is then: 
[16]  1,~~~  gTgg iii  
We assume the linear form: 
[17] 1)1(
~~
 gTg iiii   
where 10  i  represents the importance of the individual conjecture with respect to other 
people’s payments with respect to the previous level of public expenditure. If i  is close to 0, 
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then the individual believes that other agents do not react at all (zero conjectural variation)5 
and assumes that the per capita spending is constant, whereas as i  approaches 1 it is believed 
that others will react in the same direction (positive conjectural variation). 
Then agent i’s expectation about public expenditure is: 
[18]  
)(
)1(~)1( 1
Nr
gTNIdG
i
iiiii
i
   
in which NNri  )(1  is the individual estimate of the degree of rivalness of public 
expenditure. 
We assume that each agent estimates other people’s average tax payment iT
~  by using the ratio 
iii TTh /
~ , i.e. an individual estimate of the ratio between iT~  and his own tax payment, so that 
the conjecture of the agent with respect to average payments of other individuals as a 
response to his contribution is: 
[19] iiiiii IdhThT ~  
If hi>1 the agent believes that other people pay on average more than him (because, for 
instance, they have stronger preferences for public expenditure or higher incomes); when hi=1 
the agent conjectures that his payment is equal to the average one and hi<1 implies the belief 
that other people pay on average less than him. 
Substituting [19] into [17], agent i’s expectation about other people’s average contribution is: 
[20] 1)1(~  gIdhg iiiiii  . 
Hence, the influence of agent i’s tax payment on his expectation about other people’s average 
payment is: 
[21] ii
i
i h
T
g 
~  
From the above assumptions: 
 
 
)(
)1()1( 1
Nr
gIdNId
G
i
iiiiiii
i
            or 
                                                 
 
5 See Cornes, Sandler (1986) 
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[22] i
i
iiiii
i
i gNr
Ng
N
NIdh
N
N
NNr
NG
)(
)1(111
)( 1



 

    
where: 
[23] 


 

  1)1(111 gN
NIdh
N
N
N
g iiiiii   
is the per capita public expenditure expected by agent i. It is worthwhile noticing that using 
the utility function [8] the degree of rivalry and the number of individuals are positive 
constants that cannot change the optimal choice of the agent: 
[24] 
i
iii
  
iiiiii
ii
i gN
NIdh
N
N
N
y
Nr
NU












 

 




1
1
)1(
)1(111
)(1
1  
In the case of i =1, i.e. complete positive conjectural variation, the utility function reduces 
to: 
[25]    iiiiii   iiii
ii
i IdyhN
N
NNr
NU







 




1
)1()1( 11
)(1
1  
and hi does not affect the optimal choice. 
 
Utility maximization 
The taxpayer chooses the share of income to declare, di, in order to maximise the expexted 
utility: 
[26]   ),()1(,)( iiiiiiiii gWUpgZUpdEU   
The first order condition for maximising the expected utility is: 
[27] 0),()1(),()1(),(),( 




i
i
iigi
i
i
iiWi
i
i
iigi
i
i
iiZi d
ggWUp
d
WgWUp
d
ggZUp
d
ZgZUp  
where: 
  )1()1()1(),(   ii iiiiiiZ gIdfIgZU  
  )1()1(),( iii iiiiW gIgWU    
  1)1(1),(  iii iiiiig gygyU  , with y either Z or W 
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ii IfdZ  /  
iiii IhN
N
N
dg 

  11/  
ii IdW  /  
 
Obvioulsly, if i =0 for all agents 0),( iig gyU  and the standard results of the literature 
apply6. 
The optimal value of id  determines the amount of income tax actually paid iii IdT   and 
implicitly the effective tax rate of individual i: ii d  . The effective tax rate i  can be 
interpreted as the tax rate that the individual would accept to pay without evading, i.e. his 
preferred tax rate, given all exogenous variable and parameters, his preferences and 
conjectures and the control policy of the Government. 
In other words, the agent declares all income ( id =1) if the statutory tax rate   is lower than 
or equal to his preferred level i , and will evade some part (1- id )>0 if  > i . 
 
Agent’s comparative statics 
The general analysis of the model so far depicted is complex, even if we choose a specific 
form for the utility function. This is in line with the seminal papers by Allingham-Sandmo 
(1972) and Cowell-Gordon (1988) where similar models are presented and analytical 
conclusions were drawn in some cases at the price of strong simplifications. 
Our work differs in some respects from the previously mentioned approaches: 
1. first of all, under assumptions 1-4, an explicit utility function can be specified. The 
chosen Cobb-Douglas form exhibits concavity, homogeneity of degree <1 and does 
not allow for a Ziff (zero income effects) public expenditure; 
2. the measure of compliance used in this paper is the fraction of declared income, 
instead of the level of tax evasion or the level of declared income; 
3. we explicitly model the agent’s conjecture about the behaviour of other taxpayers and 
this will turn out to be an extremely important issue in the subsequent analysis. 
4. As in Yitzhaki (1974), penalties depend on the amount of evaded tax. 
 
                                                 
 
6 Allinghan, Sandmo (1972), Yithzaki (1974). 
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To gain insight in the functioning of the model, we consider a benchmark case whose 
parameters are listed below. 
 
Table 1 – Benchmark parameters’ values 
Number of agents N 1000 
Preference for public expenditure    0.5 
Relative risk aversion rsion   1.1 
Conjecture on other people response   0.5 
Conjecture on other people relative tax 
payment iii TTh /
~  
h  1 
Income I 30000 € 
Previous year public expenditure 1g  10000 € 
Probability of control p 5 % 
Penalty per € of tax evaded f 100% 
 
In the following pictures we consistently use a color code in which low and high values are 
shown with hues ranging from dark red to bright yellow, respectively. Fig. 1 shows the 
contours of compliance rate d that maximizes the expected utility function when the two 
parameters  , the relative risk aversion, and  , the relative preference for public 
expenditure, vary. The compliance rate is zero (the red zone) when both parameter are low, 
i.e. when the agent has low risk aversion and low preference of public expenditure. When   
rises, agents are willing to contribute more and the compliance rate reaches 100% on the right 
part of the picture. 
Fig. 2 shows the contours of compliance rate d that maximizes the expected utility when two 
important parameters of the enforcement system are changed. As expected, the compliance 
rate increases with the auditing probability p and with the penalty rate f. The relative effect of 
the two parameters is different, and compliance is more sensitive to an increment in the 
control probability p. 
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Figure 1 – Contours of compliance rate d as a function of utility parameters. 
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Figure 2 – Contours of compliance rate d as function of evasion control parameters 
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One of the most important features of tax evasion models is the relationship between tax 
compliance and increments in the tax rate. Fig. 3 shows that compliance gets bigger with the 
tax only when income is low. Indeed, at low tax rates, a low-income agent evades almost all 
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taxes, as the tax and the penalty are small in absolute value and the marginal utility of income 
is higher than the marginal utility of the exogenously given public expenditure (set to 10000 
€). However, increments in the tax rate raise compliance as fines more adversely impact 
utility of relatively poor agents. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Contours of compliance rate d as function of tax rate and income 
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When income is higher, agents are basically fully compliant for low tax rates, as they are 
willing to increase tax expenditure relative to income. Compliance first decreases with the tax 
rate, as public expenditure becomes over-provided but then increases again when the 
combined effect of taxation and fines kicks in. If evasion is detected when tax rates are higher 
than 50%, an agent can experience a negative income, due to the 100% penalty and, therefore, 
there is a strong incentive to avoid such a negative outcome (that nevertheless only occurs for 
extreme levels of taxation and evasion) 
To summarize, the classic and somewhat unrealistic positive relationship between tax rate 
and tax evasion is found only for low incomes in our setup (for reasonable levels of the tax 
rate). 
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3. Compliance in a population with homogenous agents 
Let’s consider a population of N agents with identical incomes and utility functions (see the 
parameters’ values in Table 1). It is interesting to look at the symmetric equilibrium outcome 
that emerges when agents are optimizing (and, hence, have no incentive to change their 
behaviour) and beliefs about the provision of public expenditure are consistent with their 
observations. 
Recall that each agent maximize the expected utility function  
   ),()1(,)( iiiiiiiii gWUpgZUpdEU   
in which Z and W are net incomes (whether they are audited or not, respectively) and the 
conjectured per capita public expenditure is: 
 


 
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N
g iiiiii   
 
We define a Bayes-Nash equilibrium where for each agent the exogenous level of public 
expenditure 1g  equals the desired level of public expenditure resulting from his utility 
maximization. So, if d* and iggg  1*  are the optimal levels for the agents, the Bayes-
Nash equilibrium is reached when: 
[28] 
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N
g iiii    for all agents i=1,…,N 
in which we additionally assume that the ratio 1ih 7. The equilibrium public expenditures 
are plotted with a thick line in Fig. 4, where the contours of the compliance rate d are plotted 
as a function of the tax rate and the level of public expenditure 1g . 
 
                                                 
 
7 In a symmetric setup, 1ih  is needed to get a nontrivial Nash equilibrium and, in fact, 1ih  leads an 
equilibrium where tax payments are null for all agents. 
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Figure 4 – Contours of compliance rate d as function of tax rate and 1g  ( )5.0i  
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The color code shows that the compliance rate is 100% when exogenous public expenditure 
and tax rate are low, while the compliance rate decreases rapidly to zero as the exogenous 
public expenditure increases. 
Each point on the blue line shows the equilibrium combination of tax rate, exogenous per 
capita public expenditure and rate of compliance (contour lines) associated with the Nash 
equilibrium. Fix, say, a tax rate of 40%: in equilibrium, the corresponding point on the blue 
line shows that the per capita public expenditure is 6666.67 and agents report d*=57% of 
their income (incidentally, as 57% is roughly halfway between 0 and 1, the underlying orange 
hue is roughly halfway between red and yellow). 
The dotted bisecting line shows, for each tax rate, the level of per capita public expenditure in 
a “honest” Nash equilibrium in which we assume that all agents are forced to pay all the 
amount of taxes required (i.e., if the probability of control is 1). 
It is worthwhile to notice that the actual Nash equilibrium line lies on the “honest”, Nash 
equilibrium in the left lower corner of the picture where both the tax rate and the exogenous 
public expenditure are low. For higher tax rates the Nash equilibrium line departs from the 
“honest” benchmark, displaying lower levels of equilibrium public expenditure and decreased 
compliance, as in the example discussed above. 
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An examination of the blue line shows, for each tax rate, the level of public expenditure that 
is generated by agents who optimally underreport their income when the required public 
expenditure, on the dashed line, is deemed excessive. Observe also that increasing the tax rate 
is ultimately forcing agents to almost fully comply, but this is again due to the (huge) cost of 
fines. The level of equilibrium public expenditure is notably flat and very marginally affected 
by the tax rate in the range 20-50%. In other words, setting a tax rate of 20%, with no tax 
evasion, produces a per capita public expenditure that is only slightly smaller than the level 
that would be obtained at 45% where agents underreport in equilibrium, “thinking” that an 
unreasonable tax burden is required.  
The agent-based simulations of the next section will show that this result robustly holds in a 
non-symmetric environment populated by heterogeneous agents where, “forcing” taxpayers to 
pay too much (in so doing accepting or perceiving an excessive public expenditure), is costly 
and requires a harsh enforcement system. 
Clearly, equilibria depend on the values (more generally, distributions) of agents’ features, 
like the preference parameter  . Figure 5 depicts several equilibrium outcomes related to 
several levels of  . As expected, higher preferences for public expenditure (i.e., higher  ) 
result in larger endogenous provision in equilibrium. 
Fig. 6 shows that the tax evasion rate in equilibrium varies as tax rate increases, but it 
decreases when the tax rate reaches 50%, for the reasons explained above. When the tax rate 
is low there is no tax evasion: an equilibrium with low tax rate and low public provision is a 
situation of under-provision of public expenditure and, really, there would be agents ready to 
pay more than the statutory tax rate. As the rate of compliance is constrained in the range 
[0,1], the rate of evasion is zero. This situation of under-provision is maintained until the tax 
rate reaches a level, 21%, that secures the desired level of public expenditure. Further 
increments of the tax rate push agents to hide of their income because they feel an over-
provision of public expenditure. The optimal level of public expenditure, 6300, can be found 
by looking at the level reached when the evasion rate start to depart from zero (see the vertical 
dotted line in Fig. 7). This statement can be understood by looking at Figure 8 where the level 
of utility (that is social welfare as all individuals are homogeneous) are shown. It can be seen 
that the maximum is achieved at the same public expenditure as in Figure 7 (dotted line) and 
at the corresponding tax rate. 
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Figure 5 – Contours of compliance rate d as function of tax rate and 1g  
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Figure 6 – Nash equilibrium tax evasion rate as function of tax rate 
( 5.0i , solid, and 0.1i , dashed) 
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Figure 7 – Nash equilibrium tax evasion rate as function of 1g  
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Figure 8 – Utility levels at Nash equilibrium  
 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-3
.2
-3
.0
-2
.8
-2
.6
-2
.4
Nash utility level
tax rate tau
N
as
h 
ut
ilit
y
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
-3
.2
-3
.0
-2
.8
-2
.6
-2
.4
Nash utility level
public expenditure
N
as
h 
ut
ilit
y
 
 
 
 20
 
4. Compliance in a population with heterogeneous agents 
The results of the previous section can be generalized in a context of heterogeneous agents 
who differ about their utility function parameters, risk aversion and relative preference for 
public expenditure. 
We assume that agents are able to decide rationally their best action in term of compliance 
rate, but do not know exactly some information about the probability of auditing and the 
amount of taxes actually paid by other people. 
Each agent collects the necessary information by meeting a limited number of other 
individuals. In particular, we assume that in each period each individual meets a fixed number 
of other agents and exchange some information. 
From the meeting the agent can learn: 
 if the other agent has been controlled 
 the amount of taxes they effectively paid 
Instead, agents do not exchange information about the owed amount of taxes and about the 
degree of compliance. 
The analytical treatment of this heterogeneous agents model is impossible, to the best of our 
knowledge. Therefore, we simulate a framework in which agents interact and dynamically 
reach an equilibrium, if it exists, in which the level of public expenditure and the rate of 
compliance become stable. 
As the population is composed by heterogeneous agents, the Nash equilibrium can be defined 
as the situation in which: 
[29] 

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g iiiii    for all agents i=1,…,N 
In this case, as agents differ in some parameters, we cannot assume that the ratio ih  is unitary 
as in the previous section. Actually, if we have, for instance, just two individuals with 
different income, then it is likely that the richer (R) will pay a higher absolute value of tax 
than the other (P), so that 1/  RPR TTh  and 1/  PRP TTh . Hence, ih ’s could not be the 
same for all individuals and a Nash equilibrium will arise only if the vector of ih ’s will 
converge to a set of compatible values. For this reason, we assume that each agent should 
learn the value of parameter ih  by means of an iterative learning process. 
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Estimate of the subjective probability of control 
An agent meets n other agents in each period and can count how many of them have been 
controlled ( cin ). From this information the agent estimates a subjective probability of control: 
nnci / . As the Government can change the true probability at any time, the agent re-estimates 
the subjective probability in each period, and we assume that the value used in the individual 
utility maximization is a weighted average of his previous estimate (with weight  ) and the 
new estimate nnci /  (with weight 1 ). So the subjective probability of control of the i-th 
agent is: 
[30] 
n
npp
c
i
tiit )1(1,     
 
Estimate of other people contribution to public expenditure 
We define the parameter ih  as the ratio of the average amount of taxes paid by his matches 
and his own payment. We assume furthermore that the value used in the utility maximization 
is a weighted average of the previous period estimate (with weight  ) and the new one (with 
weight 1 ): 
[31] 
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where )(iJ  is the set of agents that i meets at time t (which is omitted for notational 
simplicity). 
 
Auditing policy 
Auditing policy is purely random. In each period a share q of all agents is randomly 
controlled. 
 
Government 
In order to endogenize the public policy parameters, we introduce Government as an 
additional agent with the following tasks: 
- tax policy: choice of the level of income tax rate  ; 
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- provision of public good and services to be financed by the tax revenue; 
- evasion control policy: choice the fraction q of individuals to control and the fine rate f 
to punish tax evaders. 
From the maximisation of his expected utility each individual derives his preferred tax rate, so 
the Government democratically chooses the income tax rate accepted by the majority of 
voters, assuming tax payers reveal their preferred tax rate in some voting mechanism. 
Applying the standard median voter model, the tax rate can be set at the median of the 
distribution of individual effective tax rate: 
[32] )( imedian    
With respect to the evasion control policy, we assume that Government has chosen a fine rate 
by comparing the punishment for tax evasion to those for other offenses, so that f is an 
exogenous parameter in the model. Therefore the policy can rely only on the choice of the 
number of audits, i.e. the share q. As we assume that Government aims to provide the tax rate 
preferred by the majority of voters (and therefore the corresponding level of public 
expenditure, because the government budget must be in balance), the share q can be set at a 
level such that the level of income declared on average by taxpayers is sufficiently high. 
Being hard to completely eradicate tax evasion, we assume that Government set a target 
threshold of average income declared, d . Government then rises the number of audits if 
d <mean( kd ), while decreases q if d >mean( kd ), where kd  is the percentage of declared 
income of the k-th taxpayer audited. If q’ is the variation of q in a period, then: 
[33] 
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Logical phases of simulation 
The simulation is performed in four “logical” phases: 
 1st phase: the Government set an arbitrary high tax rate and does not control for tax 
evasion. In this phase each agent pays the preferred amount of taxes in order to 
maximize his utility function by computing the optimal compliance rate d. 
 2nd phase: through a voting procedure a new tax rate is set by Government. The new 
tax rate is the median of preferred tax rates. There is still no control of tax evasion. 
 3rd phase: the Government start controlling taxpayers, with a fixed probability of 
control (5%). 
 23
 4th phase: the Government check the average level of compliance of controlled agents 
and changes the number of controls in order to reach target threshold of average 
income declared, d . 
 
Table 2 show the values of parameters used in the simulations. 
 
Table 2 – Values of parameters used in the simulations 
Number of agents N 1000 
Number of matchings per agent n 10% N 
Preference for public expenditure    uniform [0.0, 1.0[ 
Relative risk aversion   uniform [0.0, 2.2] 
Conjecture on other people response   uniform [0.0, 1.0] 
Income I Lognormal 
mean: 30000 € 
Standard deviation of log: 2 
Previous year public expenditure 1g  0 € 
Probability of control q Phase I: 0 % 
Phase II: 5.0 % 
Phase III: endogeneous with 
q’=0.5% 
Initial subjective probability of control Npp ,...,1 0% 
Initial subjective estimate of other people 
contribution to public expenditure trol 
Nhh ,...,1  1 
Penalty per € of tax evaded f 100% 
weight   in ih    0.5 
weight   in ip    0.5 
 
One period of the simulation evolves according to the following steps : 
1. Agents inherit previous period parameters, maximize utility to decide the tax 
compliance and pay taxes; 
2. Government provides public expenditure, performs random control of taxpayers and 
punishes tax evaders; 
3. Agents gather information meeting other peers and revise estimates of the probability 
of control and of other agents’ tax payments. 
 
Results 
The following figures show some results of one arbitrary simulation that, obviously, cannot 
represent the full range of possible outcomes. 
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In Figure 9, depicting the evolution of the tax rate, it can be seen that the statutory rate 
stabilizes quickly at the median value of 16.04%, starting from the second phase of the 
simulation. 
In a related fashion, public expenditure (Figure 10) converges to the average values of 3816 in 
the second phase (without auditing) and to 3827 in the third phase (where 5% of taxpayers are 
audited). It is apparent that the proper choice of the tax rate generates a tax revenue that is 
only mildly lower than the one produced by the introduction of auditing. 
At the same time, the average compliance rate (Figure 11) increases from 74.00% to 76.46%. 
These results represent somewhat the Nash equilibrium values with heterogeneous agents. As 
the distributions of agents’ parameters have been chosen so that their means match the values 
of Table 1, we can compare the findings in the two cases. 
From these exercises, we can see that the equilibrium tax rate and public expenditure levels 
are lower in the heterogeneous setting. Indeed, the equilibrium tax rate drops to 16.04% from 
21% and public expenditure falls from 6300 to about 3800.  
 
Figure 9 – Tax rate evolution 
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Figure 10 – Public expenditure evolution 
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Figure 11 – Tax compliance evolution 
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As shown in Figure 12, in the fourth phase the Government must increase the audit 
probability to about 35% in order to achieve a compliance rate of 90%. Such a level of control 
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is clearly unrealistic and suggests that the target compliance rate is hard to attain even if more 
sophisticated auditing schemes. 
 
Figure 12 – Probability of control evolution 
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5. Concluding remarks 
From the model and the simulation of the paper some interesting conclusions can be drawn. 
First of all we would like to stress that even in a highly heterogeneous society, in which 
taxpayers differ in many fundamental aspects (such as risk aversion, preference for public 
expenditure, conjecture about other people’s compliance) equilibrium-like situations still 
arises. As the tax rate has been set in an endogenous way (with a median voter procedure), the 
dynamic of the model lead to situations in which a majority of taxpayers is willing to fully 
complain given reasonable levels of probability of control and size of fines, while a minority 
evade at different levels. 
The second finding is that individual characteristics (such as the preference for public 
expenditure with respect to individual income and risk aversion) are much more significant 
than auditing policy parameters to determine individual compliance. In fact, once that the 
median voter tax rate is set by the Government, only very high (and unrealistic) levels of the 
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probability of control can induce individuals with low risk aversion and low preference for 
public expenditure to reduce their tax evasion. 
Finally, we find that the presence of public expenditure can assure a positive relationship 
between the tax rate and tax evasion without assuming tax morale, social stigma or non-
standard individual preferences. 
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